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For nearly two decades, J. Baird Callicott has been 
writing and teaching at the frontier of ethical theory. 
Perhaps more than almost anyone else, Callicott has 
been working to extend this frontier in ways that correct 
the anthropocentric bias of many moral thinkers. Not 
merely a philosopher who writes about environmental 
issues, Callicott has been creating a new environmental 
ethics, one grounded in the thought of Aldo Leopold. 
His volume, In Defense ofthe LandEthic. is an excellent 
summary of his position. I It is also a good example of 
his poetic brilliance and his most effective insights. 
After highlighting the main contributions of 
Callicott's book, I shall summarize some of (what I take 
to be) his best ethical insights. In closing the discussion, 
I shall suggest several reasons why community ecology 
and natural selection may not be able to provide support 
for all of the arguments in which Callicott and others 
enlist their help. 
Callicott's Contributions 
In Chapter One of In Defense of the Land Ethic, 
("Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair"), Callicott 
argues that the familiar conflict between traditional 
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(anthropocentric) moral humanists and the humane 
moralists (or animallibemtionists) ought to be cooceived 
as a triangular, not a polar, debate. He claims that the 
Leopoldian position of land/environmental ethics 
represents the third prong of the controversy. The main 
shortcoming of the two earlier positions, argues 
Callicott, is that they are atomistic, whereas land/ 
environment ethics is holistic. 
Callicott's holistic environmental ethics "locates 
ultimate value in the biotic community and assigns 
differential moral value to the constitutive individuals 
relatively to that standard.',2 Hence, as he argues in 
Chapter Two, it makes no sense to attribute rights to 
individual inanimate objects, because nature "does not 
respect the rights of individuals."3 Because trophic 
processes, for example, do not safeguard rights of 
individuals, Callicott (in Chapter Three) follows 
Leopold in providing "only 'respect' for individual 
members of the biotic community, but 'biotic rights' 
for species"; further, he says, "in the last analysis, 'the 
integrity, beauty, and stability of the biotic community' 
is the measure of right and wrong actions affecting the 
environment.,,4 
Defending Leopold's (and his) land ethics as 
Darwinian and sociobiological, in Chapter Five 
Callicott argues persuasively that the land ethic is a 
natural result of the evolutionary extension of the 
boundaries of the moral community. Once we see land 
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as a "biotic community," says Callicott, the land or 
environmental ethic emerges. The "conceptual and 
logical foundations of the land ethic," he says, are 
evolutionary and ecological biology, "a Copernican 
cosmology, a Darwinian protosociobiologicall18lural 
history of ethics, Darwinian ties of kinship among all 
forms of life on earth, and an Eltonian model of the 
structure of biocenoses all overlaid on a Humean­
Smithian moral psychology. Its logic is that natural 
selection has endowed human beings with an affective 
moral response to perceived bonds of kinship and 
community membership and identity; that today the 
natural environment, the land, is represented as a 
community." 5 More specifteally, Callicott argues that 
the biotic community, currcntly vicwed as the 
ecosystem, has moral considerability because it is the 
object of a specially evolved public affection that all 
psychologically nonnal humans have inherited from a 
long line of primates.6 
In Callicott's view, the biotic community has not 
only moral considerability but primacy; he writes, "not 
only are other sentient creatures members of the biotic 
community and subordinate to its integrity, beauty, and 
stability; so are we. .. , human beings are equally subject 
to the same subordination of individual welfare and 
rights in respect to the good of the community as a 
whole. ,,7 Callicott claims, however, that this 
subordination does not lead to what Regan calls 
"environmental fascism," devaluing humans in the 
name of environmental welfare. Callicott maintains 
that such fascism cannotoccur because humans are stilll 
bound to respect individual human rights: "prior moral 
sensibilities and obligations attendant upon and 
correlative to prior~trata of social involvement remain 
operative and preemptive."s . 
Although CaIlioott's and l..eqJold's landIenviromnentai 
ethic rests on "the ecological concept of a biotic 
community,"9 Callicott goes to some length to defend 
the intrinsic value of nonhuman species. At least part 
of his motivation is the widespread species extinctions 
occurring all over the planet.10 
Providing for the intrinsic value of natural entities 
and nature as a whole, however, is problematic because 
this value apparently must be grounded in some property 
of abe entity. Yet anyone could reasonably deny that a 
particular natural or metaphysical property, e.g., 
"richness," is truly good. To counter this difficulty, 
Callicott argues in Chapter Nine that "good and evil, 
like beauty and ugliness, rest in the fmal analysis upon 
feelings or sentiments which are, as it were, projected 
onto objects, persons, or actions and affectively 'color' 
them."11 In so arguing, Callicott realizes that "intrinsic 
or inherent value in nature in the strict, objective sense of 
the terms must by definition be abandoned if one 
assumes a Humean subjectivist axiology." Neverthe­
less, he says, this subjectivist axiology allows natural 
beings to "be valued for themselves."12 It also escapes 
relativism, according to Callicott, because sociobiology 
has achieved a "consensus of feeling" through the 
"biologization of ethics." Human ethical feelings, he 
claims, "have been standardized by natural selection."13 
Moreover, he says, "since nature is the self fully 
extended and diffused, and the self, complementarily. 
is nature concentrated and focused ... nature is 
intrinsically valuable to the extent that the self is 
intrinsically valuable.,,14 
Having explained various aspects of his environ­
mental ethic, Callicott argues in Chapters Ten and 
Eleven that American Indian cultures provided their 
members with a land "wisdom" and an environmental 
ethical ideal that could help guide us out of our 
environmental malaise. In the next two chapters of his 
volume, Callicott argues, respectively. that genuine 
ecological education is the main way to reorient persons 
toward a land/environmental ethic, and that land 
aesthetics can contribute to the effort because it "calls 
attention to the psychic-spiritual rewards of maintaining 
the biological integrity and diversity of the rural 
landscape."15 
CaUicott's Ethical Insights 
Apart from whether one agrees with all aspects of 
Callicott's subjectivist environmental ethics, he has 
brought a number of insights to the study of how and 
why we value nature. I shall mention only four of these 
insights. First, in ChapterTwo, Callicott points out that 
one of the difficulties with the animal-rights position is 
that often its proponents do not distinguish human­
domestic communities (that include nonhuman animals) 
from natural or wild biotic communities. Instead. he 
argues, they say that being a subject of a life (in some 
sense) is sufficient for being a rights-holder.t 6 Apart 
from whether most animalliberationists fall victim to 
this error,17 Callicott's insight is a correct one. This is 
that the community concept is essential to the notion of 
moral obligation, and that different kinds of commu­
nities undergird different moral obligations. The insight 
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is important, not only because much of contemporary 
ethics is erroneously individualistic/atomistic but also 
because significant philosophical discussions tum on 
the necessity of a shared moral community as the basis 
ofduties to community members. Indeed, many of the 
arguments about rights to future generations focus on 
whether present and future persons can share the same 
kind of moral community (have the same conception 
of the good) as we do. Hence Callicott's point is not 
only helpful to his own argument but also central to 
moral philosophy in general. 
Another Callicott insight, admittedly one noted by 
other thinkers as well, is that, throughout history we 
have gradually extended the boundaries of our moral 
community (Chapter Five). We have expanded our 
ethical sensitivities from while males to include blacks, 
women, children, the insane, persons spatially and 
Iemporally removed from us, all living beings, and even 
the natural environment. In emphasizing this important 
truth of descriptive ethics, Callicott challenges us both 
to broaden ourown sensitivities and to rethink classical 
ethical theory. 
Likewise, in a significant departure from traditional 
ethical theory, Callicott insightfully follows Hume and 
Darwin in arguing that altruism is as fundamental in 
human nature as egoism. and that there are inborn 
natural sentiments that have society as their natural 
object18 Given the postulated egoism of the two main 
schools of modem moral philosophy (the deontological 
and the utilitarian), as Goodpasterreeognizes, Callicott's 
taking the "higher road" of altruism is nothing short of 
refreshing and prophetic. The rational grounds for his 
doing so are compelling, because most arguments that 
all actions are done for self-serving reasons presuppose 
a tautological definition of"selfserving" and are hence 
nonfalsifiable, nonempirical, and highly ideological. 
The psychological and political grounds for endorsing 
Callicott's founding moral philosophy on altruism are 
that positing such a foundation, even if it cannot be 
proved, is the only possible way of hoping to avoid 
narcissism. Otherwise, egoism will be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy for us all. 
Finally, although I do not believe that "naturally 
selected" feelings justify particular ethical stances (see 
the arguments of the next section), Callicott is insightful 
when he argues that many moral values originate in the 
feelings. This insight locates the psychological 
beginnings (if not the justification) or morality in the 
correct place. Indeed without feelings like compassion, 
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it is questionable whether a principled and rational 
morality is ever able to develop. Callicott's emphasis 
on feelings as the originators of morality is important, 
in part, because it forces those of us inlerested in moral 
education to emphasize the development of the whole 
person, not just to nurture her ability to engage in 
rational analysis. His insight is also significantbecause 
it enables environmentalists to begin environmental 
education at the level of feeling, at the level of 
experiences in nature, that Holmes Rolston recognized 
as crucial.19 Both these benefits would have been lost, 
had Callicott taken a more traditional, rationalistic 
approach to the origins of moral development 
Problems with Biological and Ethical Holism 
With so much to praise in Callicott, especially his 
insistence on the importance ofaltruism and expanding 
our moral communities, are there areas in which his 
views are arguably false? The answer to this question, 
for me, is "yes," and the grounds for this response are, 
in part, biological. These are that (1) there is no 
biologically coherent notion of "community" robust 
enough to ground either contemporary scientific theory 
in community ecology or environmental ethics; (2) 
contrary to Callicott's suggestion in Chapter Two, it is 
not possible to safeguard the interests of biological 
communities; and (3) in relying on natural-selection 
mechanisms to deliver it from relativism, Callicott's 
evolutionary ethics has lost its normative dimension. 
Let's examine these three points in order. 
Following Leopold, Callicott argues thatall creatures 
are subordinate to the integrity, beauty, and stability of 
the biotic community (see note 7). This imperative is 
problematic from a biological point of view because 
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there is a clear notion neither of balance, integrity, or 
stability, nor of community. There is, for example, no 
clear sense in which one can claim that natural 
ecosystems proceed toward homeostasis, stability, or 
some balance.20 Likewise there is no consensus among 
ecologists on the ecosystemic view of balance or 
stability,21 and almost no support for the diversity­
stability view held by MacArthur, Hutchinson, and 
CommonerP The reasons for the disfavor atlributed 
to the view of MacArthur, et al are both empirical and 
theoretical. Salt marshes and the rocky intertidal are 
two of the many counterexamples to the diversity­
stability view,23 and empirically based counterexamples 
have multiplied over the last two decades. May, Levins, 
Connell, and others have seriously challenged the 
diversity-stability hypothesis on both mathematical and 
field-based grounds.24 Even though some laypersons 
and policymakers appeal to the hypothesis,25 most 
ecologists have either repudiated it or cast strong doubt 
on il26 
Doubts about balance and stability have arisen, in 
part, because ecologists cannot say what it would be, 
in a non-question-begging way, to hinder some balance, 
stability, or integrity. This is because communities and 
ecosystems regularly change and regularly eliminate 
species. Nature doesn't merely extirpate species or 
cause them to move elsewhere because their niches are 
gone. And if not, then there are no clear ecological 
grounds for defining and preserving some balance or 
stability. Hence it is not clear that Leopold's and 
Callicott's appeal to ecology can help environmental 
ethics in any precise, scientific wayP 
It will not do to say that what happens naturally 
is good, whereas what happens through human inter­
vention is bad; this would be to solve the problem of 
defining "balance" or "stability" in a purely stipulative 
or ad hoc way. Nor can the criterion be merely that it is 
wrong for humans to do quickly (e.g., cause lake 
eutrophication) what nature does more slowly. One 
would need an argument (given neither by Callicott nor 
.Leopold) that accelerating ecosystemic changes is bad, 
even if the changes themselves are natural. 
Another conceptual problem besetting environmental 
appeals to ecological balance, wholeness, or integrity 
is that ecologists must take into account thousands of 
different communities, species, and individuals, all 
relative to the health or balance of an ecosystem or the 
biosphere. It is unclear both how to define the health 
of a system (as opposed to an individual), since system 
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health is relative to some specific goal, and how to 
define the system at issue. The ecological problem of 
defining the system at issue is analogous to the 
economic problem ofdefining a theory of social choice 
and choosing some "whole" that aggregates or 
represents numerous individual choices. 
Defining an ecological "whole" to which Callicott 
and Leopold can refer is especially problematic, both 
because the biologists (e.g., Clements, Elton, Forbes) 
cited by Callicott to explicate his views are no longer 
accepted by contemporary scientists as being correct, 
and because the contemporary variant of Clements' 
position, the GAIA hypothesis, has been rejected by 
most ecologists as unproved metaphor or mere 
speculation. They admit the scientific facts of 
interconnectedness and coevolution on a small scale, 
but they point out that ecosystems and communities do 
notpersist through time. Hence there is no clear referent 
for the alleged "dynamic stability" of an ecosystem or 
community.28 
Moreover, it is not clear which (of many) alleged 
ecological communities it is whose balance or stability 
ought to be sought. One could seek to stabilize 
(whatever that means) the ecosystem,29 or the 
association,30 or the trophic level, for example. Or, if 
one is a holist, then why should not the collection of 
communities and ecosystems be optimized, namely, the 
biosphere? Optimizing the well-being of a particular 
community typically leads neither to the optimization 
ofanother community, nor to that of the biosphere, nor 
to that of a particular association. Ifnot, than Callicott 
has no scientific basis for choosing a given "whole" as 
the unit that is to be optimized.31 One can make a value 
judgment to optimize the well-being of a particular 
community or the biosphere, or some ecosystem, but 
this is just that, a value judgment. Such a judgment is 
not part of ecological science. 
Admittedly, once one makes a value judgment 
about which particular whole one wants to stabilize 
or balance, it is obvious that particular ecological 
conclusions are valid within certain spatial and temporal 
scales. Nevertheless Po given ecological conclusion 
regarding balance or integrity, for example, typically 
holds for some "wholes," e.g., communities, but not 
for others. Ecologists cannot optimize the welfare of 
all the different wholes (each having a different spatial 
and temporal scale) at the same time. Because they 
cannot, there is no general level at which ecological 
problem solving takes place. Hence there is no general 
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temporal or spatial scale within which a stable "whole" 
is exhibited. 
Because there is no universal ecological theory that 
can be appealed to in derming the "whole" about which 
Leopold and Callicott speak, ecologists are forced to 
work on acase-by-case basis. They recognize that there 
is no universal level, across all communities, at which 
some balanced or stable whole exists. In part this is 
because numerous alleged "wholes," e.g., populations, 
exhibit density vagueness rather than density 
dependence, while other wholes do not.32 It is also 
because many ecosystemic or holistic explanations are 
neither falsifiable nor even testable. This is why at least 
one scientist called ecosystems ecology "theological 
ecology.,,33 There is neither a clear definition of what 
it is to be balanced or stable, nor a clear definition of 
the whole that is allegedly balanced or stable. This is 
ultimately because theorists do not agree on the 
underlying processes that structure communities and 
ecosystems.34 
A second biological problem with Callicott's 
grounding environmental ethics on ecology occurs in 
Chapters Two and Three. There he argues in favor of 
duties to the biotic community and against according 
rights to individual members of the biotic community. 
He argues against the latter because he says that it is 
not possible to safeguard the rights of each individual; 
such a "safeguard" would stop all trophic processes 
beyond photosynthesis.35 
The biological problem with Callicott's reasoning 
here is that nature does not respect communities either. 
There is strong biological evidence (e.g., fossilized 
pollens) of radical changes in community composition 
and structure throughout history. These changes in 
community composition and structure, in tum, suggest 
that there is no such thing as a stable or balanced 
community "type" existing through time. Rather the 
types only appear stable because our time frame of 
examination is relatively short. Even if climate and 
environment remained the same, communities could 
not be classified into balanced or stable "types" on 
the basis of climate. Both spatial and temporal 
fluctuations undercut any universal notion of a stable 
or balanced community.36 And if so, then the same 
argument that Callicott uses against Regan (in his 
Chapters Two and Three) can be used against him. 
Nature does not respect communities so, on 
Callicott's own terms (this is not an argument that I 
would make), how can he avoid a stipulative and 
question-begging argument that humans ought to 
respect communities? 
A third problem with Callicott's using biology to 
undergird his environmental ethics is that he destroys 
the normative dimension of his ethics. This occurs 
because Callicott reasons, quite correctly, that in relying 
on a Humean notion of ethics, he is open to the charge 
of ethical relativism. He avoids this relativism by 
postulating that ethical uniformity/unanimity is 
achieved by means of natural selection. He says 
"human feelings...have been standardized by natural 
selection" (see note 13). The problem this creates, 
however, is that one cannot be morally bound to do 
something against natural selection or against his 
genetic make-up. And onecannot be praised for acting 
in accord with natural selection. Either a certain ethical 
tendency is selected for, or it is not. This means that 
behavioral uniformities that are explained through 
natural selection are descriptive, not normative. Hence 
Callicott has admittedly saved his ethics from 
relativism, but at the price of its "oughtness" or 
normative character. 
A similar situation occurs when epistemologists 
attempt to explain rules or norms of knowing by means 
ofnatural selection; their "evolutionary epistemology," 
apart from its other problems, is naturalized, descriptive, 
and non-normative. It is no longer epistemology, but 
psychology.37 Like evolutionary epistemology, 
Callicott's evolutionary ethics runs into these same 
problems. Why does this follow? There are at least 
three difficulties with appealing to natural selection 
as a way of grounding evolutionary ethics. First, 
arriving at ethical beliefs/actions relies on cognitive and 
evaluative aims, on anticipating experience, solving 
problems, and so on. The evolution : ethics analogy 
therefore breaks down because, although evolution does 
not operate according to ends or aims, ethics does. 
Moreover, evolution and natural selection ignore the 
contribution to reflective self-understanding of 
ourselves as agents of inquiry, while this reflective 
agency is at the core of ethical knowledge.38 Moreover, 
the natural selection explanation fails to explain how 
someone could make the first correct ethical guess or 
have the first ethical feeling; at best, natural selection 
could only explain later correct guesses or feelings.39 
Evolution and ethics are also disanalogous in that, 
in ethics, we select theories/behavior on the basis of 
hypotheses about the facts and our evaluations of 
them. In evolution, however, each variation arises 
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independently of the adaptive needs of the organism. 
The facts themselves, not our theories or evaluations 
of them, guide evolution. Hence evolution is blind to 
the adaptive needs of the organism, whereas ethics is 
blind to the facts, and can see only hypotheses about 
the facts.40 
A third difficulty with Callicott's (or any) 
evolutionary ethics is that he uses it to move from 
biological theory to realistic ethics. But for this 
inference to be successful, we must know that the 
organism has an accurate representation of the 
environment. We don't know this.41 For all these 
reasons, Callicott's appeal to natural selection appears 
to create more philosophical problems than it solves. 
Conclusion 
If Callicott is unable to use natural selection and 
community ecology to "bail out" environmental ethics, 
then where do we go from here? Clearly Callicott 
deserves high praise for showing us much of what is 
wrong with traditional moral philosophy. Nevertheless, 
my own preferences are for a metaphysical account that 
posits intrinsic value in nature itself, an account that 
deviates only slightly from that of Paul Taylor (see note 
17). Admittedly, however, there is neither time nor 
space to discuss such an account here. Ifmy preferences 
eventually prove to be correct, then despite Callicott's 
poetic brilliance and his creative appeal to biology, we 
must follow a path somewhat different from his. 
Perhaps ultimately we must rely more on metaphysics, 
and less on biological science, if we wish to build (or 
discover) an environmental ethics. Just as we learned 
that there are no "technological fixes" that will give us 
easy answers to environmental problems, perhaps also 
there are no "scientific fixes" (like natural selection) 
that will give us easy answers to ethical problems. 
Callicott has helped us begin to ask the hard questions. 
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might be stable, integral, and balanced. It is not clear that 
there is a moral reason, short of human welfare, to prefer one 
temporal arrangement or stability over another. In other 
words, the evolutionary foundations of ecology seem to 
undercut a precise defmition of stability, at least a defmition 
formulated in purely non-anthropocentric terms. Admittedly 
it is easy to formulate some defmition of stability in terms of 
human needs and interests, but this is precisely what 
proponents ofholism typically want to avoid doing; they want 
a non-anthropocentric environmental ethics. 
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But if there is no accepted natural process followed by 
ecosystems that are "maximizing excellence," then how did 
competition become so entrenched in "explaining" 
ecosystemic processes? One scientistclaims that competition 
has survived as an hypothesis merely because it fits in with 
our notions of homeostasis and the balance of nature. (R. 
Levin, "Santa Rosalia Was a Goat," Science 221 [12 August 
1983]: 636-639.) If this is so, and I think that it is, then 
ecology is in the midst of a revolution, Kulmian or not, to 
overthrow entrenched and untestable competitionism. This 
is a significant revolution because competitionism allegedly 
provides the major explanation of the processes underlying 
natural systems: it allegedly explains the "machine" which 
drives the ecosystem to maximize something or other called 
"excellence." 
3S Callicott, LE, pp. 43, 51. 
36 See the Strong reference in note 32. See also M. 
Davis, "Climatic Instability, Time Lags, and Community 
Disequilibrium," and R. Graham, "Response of Mammalian 
Communities to Environmental Changes During the Late 
Quaternary," in Community Ecology, eds. 1. Diamond and T. 
Case (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), pp. 269-284 and 
300-313. 
37 Our arriving at a particular ethical stance, on a 
sociobiological account, is not determined by our current 
experience, or whether we think the stance is morally 
justifiable, or whether or not it is a correction of previous 
erroneous stances. This is because neither in the production 
of evolutionary variations nor in the elimination of 
disadvantageous variations is there any reference to an end 
of producing "fit" species. Adaptive needs have little to do 
with the promotion of moral goodness. Hence there is litde 
reason to believe that millions of years of evolution should 
"guarantee" anything, especially moral value. This is because, 
within evolutionary theory, the probability of variation 
occurring is independent of the need for a change to produce 
a better fit between organisms and the environment Within 
the knowledge process, however, the probability of a varied 
hypothesis occurring is not independent of the need for a 
change to produce a better fit between a moral stance and the 
facts. See W. Bartley, "Philosophy of Biology Versus 
Philosophy ofPhysics," inG. Radnitzky and W. Bardey, 008., 
Evolutioruuy Epistemology, Rationality. and tN! Sociology 
ofKnowledge (La Salle, IDinois: Open Court, 1987), pp. 24­
25, who makes similar points regarding evolutionary 
epistemology. See also A. O'Hear, "Has the Theory of 
Evolution Any Relevance to Philosophy?" Ratio XXIX (1 
June 1987): 19-23; hereafter cited as: o'Hear. Finally see 
C. Hookway, "Naturalism, FalIibilism, and Evolutionary 
Epistemology," in C. Hookway, ed., Minds, Machines. and 
Evolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 
pp. 1-16; hereafter cited as: Hookway. 
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38 Hookway, pp. 13-15, makes similar points. See also 
O'Hear, pp. 27-29. 
39 Even if we need blind variation to acquire new 
knowledge, moral progress could not occur if the variation 
were totally blind. Moreover, the sociobiologist is unable to 
explain the probability of the first correct ethical stance. (P. 
Skagestad, '"faking Evolution Seriously: Critical Comments 
on D. T. Campbell's Evolutionary Epistemology," in TN! 
Monist 61, No.4 (October 1978): 615, makes a similar point; 
hereafter cited as: Skagestad.) And if not, then he has not 
explained ethics as we know it 
40 The opportunism of biological evolution has no 
counterpart in the evolution of ethics because evolution is 
characterized by blindness before the fact and wisdom after 
the fact, whereas ethics is not wholly wise either before or 
after the fact. Once we grant that ethical stances are selected 
in part on the ground of hypotheses about the facts, rather 
than on the ground of the facts themselves, then the blindness 
of hypothesis formation is carried over to the stage of 
hypothesis selection. Hence evolution is not blind in the way 
that moral evolution is blind. Why should one say these two 
cases are similar, and that they both involve natural selection? 
They are wildly disanalogous. Skagestad, p. 617, makes a 
similar point. 
41 O'Hear, p. 25, makes a similar point. 
Fall 1990 
